v. 1. Information and economic analysis -- v. 2. Information and economic analysis: applications to capital, labor, and product market --

volume 1 Perspectives on information analysis. Information and economic analysis ; Information and the change in the paradigm in economics -- The general theory of screening. The theory of "screening, " education, and the distribution of income ; A model of employment outcomes illustrating the effect of the structure of information on the level and distribution of income / with Michael Rothschild -- Theory of self-selection. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information / with Michael Rothschild ; Competition and insurance twenty years later / with Michael Rothschild ; Monopoly, non-linear pricing and imperfect information: the insurance market ; Prices and queues as screening devices in competitive markets ; Sorting out the differences between screening and signaling models / with Andrew Weiss -- Theory of adverse selection, efficiency wages, and credit rationing. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information / with Andrew Weiss ; Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device / with Carl Shapiro ; The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality on price -- Theory of incentives and economic organization. Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping ; Information, competition, and markets / with Barry Nalebuff ; Human fallibility and economic organization / with Raaj Sah ; The basic analytics of moral hazard / with Richard Arnott ; Credit markets and the control of capital ; Peer monitoring and credit markets. Information and prices. Information and competitive price systems / with Sanford Grossman ; Bargains and ripoffs: a model of monopolistically competitive price dispersion / with Steven Salop ; On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets / with Sanford Grossman ; A nonconcavity in the value of information / with Roy Radner -- Welfare economics of information. Externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets / with Bruce Greenwald ; Moral hazard and nonmarket institutions: dysfunctional crowding out or peer monitoring? / with Richard Arnott -- Information and macro economics. Informational imperfections in the capital market and macroeconomic fluctuations / with Bruce Greenwald and Andrew Weiss ; Financial market imperfections and business cycles / with Bruce Greenwald.

volume 2 Preface to Volume II ; I: SURVEYS AND PERSPECTIVES ; Introduction ; 1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective ; 2. Information and Competition ; II: CAPITAL MARKETS ; IIA: INFORMATION AND CAPITAL MARKETS ; Introduction ; 3. Information and Capital Markets ; 4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading ; 5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets ; 6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale ; 7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. Gale ; IIB: CREDIT AND EQUITY RATIONING ; Introduction ; 8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss ; 9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss ; 10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann ; IIC: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF CAPITAL MARKETS ; Introduction ; 11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald ; 12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss ; 13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment ; 14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey ; 15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz ; 16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. Edlin ; III: INFORMATION AND LABOR MARKETS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF INCENTIVES ; IIIA: INCENTIVES ; Introduction ; 17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives ; 18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy ; 19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff ; 20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing ; IIIB: EFFICIENCY WAGES ; Introduction ; 21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model ; 22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model ; 23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. Rodriguez ; IIIC: WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS, SEARCH, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ; Introduction ; 24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution ; 25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott ; IV. THE PURE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE ; Introduction ; 26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard ; 27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott ; 28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. Arnott ; V. INFORMATION AND PRODUCT MARKETS ; Introduction ; 29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets ; 30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop ; 31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information ; 32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?.