Introduction: Cooperative Models in International Relations Research / Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher -- I. Game Theory and Cooperation: General Aspects. 1. Sources in Game Theory for International Relations Specialists / Barry O'Neill. 2. On Coalition Games / Martin Shubik. 3. From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security / Michael D. Intriligator. 4. A Theory of Cooperation in the Triad / Urs Luterbacher -- II. Game Theory and Cooperation: Specific Applications. 5. International Cooperation Among Relative-Gains Maximizers / Duncan Snidal. 6. The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory / Robert Powell. 7. Implementation Through Sequential Unanimity Games / Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont -- III. Deterrence. 8. Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World / Barry Nalebuff. 9. A Question of Procedure at the Vienna Arms Talks / Barry O'Neill -- IV. Escalation and Crises. 10. Limited Nuclear Options and the Dynamics of Escalation / Robert Powell. 11. Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining / James D. Morrow. 12. Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis / Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour -- V. Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation. 13. The Origin of Games: A Theory of the Formation of Ordinal Preferences and Games / Vinod K. Aggarwal and Pierre Allan. 14. An Economic Analysis of Cooperation in the European Community / S. Weber and H. Wiesmeth. 15. Labor Relations in International Comparison, or Why Humans (and Nations) Sometimes Cooperate and Sometimes Don't / Jean-Christian Lambelet.