Skip to:Content
|
Bottom
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics için kapak resmi
Başlık:
The impact of incomplete contracts on economics
Yazar:
Aghion, Philippe, editor.
ISBN:
9780199826223

9780199826216
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
xiv, 419 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
İçerik:
Machine generated contents note: -- PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 1986 -- (1) Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart (1986) -- John Moore (University of Edinburgh) -- (2) Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets -- Bengt Holmström (MIT) -- (3) Remarks on Incomplete Contracting -- Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) -- (4) Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories -- Steven Tadelis (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs) -- (5) Grossman and Hart and Applied Theory -- Thomas Hubbard (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) -- PART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries -- (6) Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions -- Wouter Dessein (Columbia University) -- (7) Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions" -- Francine Lafontaine (University of Michigan) -- (8) Comment on "Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries : new Directions" by Wouter Dessein -- Michael D. Whinston (MIT) -- PART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization -- (9) Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms -- Phillipe Aghion (Harvard University), Nicholas Bloom (Stanford University), John Van Reenen (London School of Economics) -- (10) Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms, John Roberts (Stanford University) -- (11) The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model : comments on "Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms, " by P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen -- W. Bentley McLeod (Columbia University) -- PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance -- (12) Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control -- Patrick Bolton (Columbia University) -- (13) Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control" -- Efraim Benmelech (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University) -- (14) Why Incomplete Contract is Important for Finance -- Luigi Zingales (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) -- PART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms -- (15) Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing -- Josh Lerner (Harvard University) -- (16) Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital -- Steve Kaplan (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business) -- (17) Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small Firms -- Jeremy C. Stein (Harvard University) -- PART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization -- (18) Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future -- Patrick Legros (Université libre de Bruxelles) and Andrew F. Newman (Boston University) -- (19) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman -- Mathias Dewatripont (Université libre de Bruxelles and National Bank of Belgium) -- (20) Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization : Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman -- Kai-Uwe Kühn (University of Michigan) -- PART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade -- (21) Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global : Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production -- Pol Antràs (Harvard University) -- (22) Comment on Pol Antràs: "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global : Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production" -- Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University) -- (23) The Theory of the Firm Goes Global -- Dalia Marin (University of Munich) -- PART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership -- (24) Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms -- Paul Grout (University of Bristol) -- (25) Firm Ownership : The Legacy of Grossman and Hart -- Henry Hansmann (Yale Law School) -- (26) Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property Rights -- Rohan Pitchford (Australian National University) -- PART 9 Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy -- (27) Political Treaties as Incomplete Contracts -- Bård Harstad (University of Oslo) -- (28) Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy -- Gerard Roland (University of Berkeley) -- (29) Incomplete Contracting and the Design of Constitutions -- Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University) -- PART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity -- (30) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts -- Eric Maskin (Harvard University) -- (31) Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts -- John Moore (University of Edinburgh) -- (32) Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design -- Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) -- (33) Complexity and Undescribability -- Nabil I. Al-Najjar (Nothwestern University), Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), and Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics) -- PART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication -- (34) New Directions of Incomplete Contracts : Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation -- Christian Zehnder (University of Lausanne) -- (35) Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points -- Klaus Schmidt (University of Munich) -- (36) Incomplete Contracting in the Field -- Antoinette Schoar (Harvard University)
Özet:
"Papers on the impact that aproperty right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession"--
Konu Başlığı:

Holds:
Copies:

Mevcut:*

Library
Materyal Türü
Demirbaş
Yer Numarası
Durumu / Lokasyon / İade Tarihi
Arıyor...
Kitap EKOBKN0005714 346.73022 IMP 2016
Arıyor...

On Order

Go to:Top of Page