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Designing economic mechanisms için kapak resmi
Başlık:
Designing economic mechanisms
Yazar:
Hurwicz, Leonid. author
ISBN:
9780521836418
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
ix, 344 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
İçerik:
Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. Mechanisms and mechanism design -- 1.0. Introduction -- 1.1. Mechanisms and design -- 1.2. Environments and goal functions -- 1.3. Mechanisms : message exchange processes and game forms -- 1.4. Initial dispersion of information and privacy preservation -- 1.5. Mechanism design -- 1.6. Mechanism design illustrated in a Walrasian example -- 1.1. An Edgeworth box economy -- 1.6.2. The Walrasian goal function -- 1.6.3. Mechanisms : the competitive mechanism -- 1.6.4. Competitive equilibrium conditions -- 1.6.5. The competitive mechanism is a mechanism -- 1.6.6. The competitive mechanism illustrates some concepts used in mechanism design -- 1.6.7. Privacy preservation in the competitive mechanism -- 1.6.8. Deriving a mechanism (not the competitive mechanism) from a covering for the Walrasian goal function -- 1.6.9. Informational properties of the two mechanisms -- 1.6.10. The rectangles methods applied to the Walrasian goal function -- informal -- 1.7. Introductory discussion of informational efficiency concepts -- 1.8. A national forest. 2. From goals to means : constructing mechanisms -- 2.1. Phase one : mechanism construction -- 2.1.1. Two examples -- 2.1.2. Constructing a "universal" method of designing informationally efficient mechanisms realizing a given goal function -- 2.1.3. The method of rectangles (RM) -- 2.2. Phase 2 : constructing decentralized mechanisms, from parameter indexed product structures : transistion to message-indexed product structures -- 2.2.0. Introduction -- 2.2.1. Basic concepts -- 2.2.2. The L-dot example -- 2.2.3. More examples -- 2.2.4. General issues in mechanism construction -- 2.2.5. Mechanism construction for partitions -- 2.3. Smooth transversal construction for partitions by the "Flagpole" method -- 2.3.1. Flagpoles : general principles -- 2.3.2. Flagpoles : example 2 (augmented inner product) -- 2.3.3. Flagpoles : a Walrasian example -- 2.3.4. Unique solvability implies partition -- 2.4. Analytic aspects -- 2.4.1. Phase two via condensation. General principles -- 2.4.2. The Mount-Reiter condensation theorem (sufficiency) -- 2.4.3. Walrasian mechanism construction -- 2.4.4. Phase two of mechanism design via condensation for the augmented two-dimensional inner product -- 2.5. Overlaps -- 2.5.0. Constructing a mechanism when the parameter-indexed product structure is not a partition : an example -- Appendix. 2.6. Informational efficiency -- 2.6.1. Main results -- 2.6.2. The maximality of reflexive RM-coverings -- 2.6.3. Informational efficiency : general considerations -- 2.6.4. A comment on informational efficiency concepts -- 2.6.5. Minimal informational size is achievable by an rRM mechanism -- 2.6.6. Two rRM coverings of different informational size for the same goal function: an example -- Appendix -- 3. Designing informationally efficient mechanisms using the language of sets -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Mechanism design -- 3.2.1. Decentralization -- 3.3. Mechanisms and coverings -- 3.4. A systematic process for constructing an rRM covering -- 3.4.1. OrRM: an algorithm for constructing an rRM covering of a finite parameter space that is minimal in the class of rectangular, F-contour contained coverings -- 3.5. Constructing a mechanism from a covering by the transversals method (TM) -- g 3.6. Coverings and partitions -- 3.7. Informational efficiency -- 3.7.1. Introduction -- 3.7.2. Observational efficiency -- 3.7.3. The maximality of rRM-coverings -- 3.7.4. Informational size and coarseness -- 3.8. Section 1.8 revisited : a graphical presentation -- 3.9. Strategic behavior -- 3.9.1. Dominant strategy implementation -- 3.9.2. Designing informationally efficient Nash-implementing mechanisms -- Appendix : Characterizations of partitions. 4. Revelation mechanisms -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.1.1. computational complexity of functions -- 4.1.2. Separator sets and quotients -- 4.1.3. Algebraic conditions -- 4.1.4. Privacy-preserving mechanisms -- 4.2. Initia set-theoretic constructions -- 4.2.1. Encoded and essential revelation mechanisms -- 4.2.2. F-equivalence and encoded revelation mechanisms -- 4.3. The topological case -- 4.3.1. Differential separability -- 4.3.2. The number of variables on which F really depends -- 4.3.3. Rank conditions and construction of an essential revelation mechanism for F -- 4.4. Proofs and examples -- 4.4.1. Leontief and Abelson theorem -- 4.4.2. Leontief's theorem -- 4.4.3. An example of the coordinate construction -- 4.4.4. Proof of theorem 4.4.6 -- References -- Index.
Özet:
"This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures can be viewed as algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. Beyond this, given a mechanism that implements a goal function in Nash equilibrium, our algorithm constructs a decentralized, informationally efficient mechanism that implements that goal function in correlated equilibrium."--Jacket.
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Kitap EKOBKN0009918 330.015195 HUR 2006
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