Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality
tarafından
 
Adolph, Christopher, 1976-

Başlık
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality

Yazar
Adolph, Christopher, 1976-

ISBN
9781107032613
 
9781107567092

Yazar Ek Girişi
Adolph, Christopher, 1976-

Fiziksel Tanımlama
xxiii, 357 pages ; 25 cm.

Seri
Cambridge series in comparative politics.
 
Cambridge studies in comparative politics.

İçerik
Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Career theories of monetary policy -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion.

Özet
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably

Konu Başlığı
Para politikası.
 
Monetary policy.
 
Bankalar ve bankacılık, merkez -- Siyasi yönler.
 
Banks and banking, Central -- Political aspects.
 
Bürokrasi.
 
Bureaucracy.


LibraryMateryal TürüDemirbaşYer NumarasıDurumu / Lokasyon / İade Tarihi
Ekonomi KütüphanesiKitapEKOBKN0001851332.11 ADO 2013Merkez Kütüphane Genel Koleksiyon