Table of Contents Abbreviations 13 List of Figures 17 List of Graphs 19 List of Tables 21 1. Interest groups success – many open questions 23 1.1. Literature on interest groups and interest group systems 27 1.1.1. Defining interest groups 28 1.1.2. Interest group systems 29 1.2. Interest group systems and the process of policy making 33 1.3. Expected variance in iron and steel interests across countries 34 1.4. Research design and findings 35 1.5. Contributions of the analysis 35 1.6. Plan of the book 37 2. Interest group systems and special interest policies 39 2.1. Iron and steel policies – a definition and its empirical variance 39 2.1.1. From resources policies in general to economic policies 39 2.1.2. From economic policies to the focus on iron and steel policies 41 2.1.3. Who is behind iron and steel? 43 2.2. Defining special interest policies for iron and steel industries 44 2.2.1. Policies that contain benefits for firms 44 2.2.2. Characteristics of special interest policies 45 2.2.3. A special interest policy for the iron and steel industry 47 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26935 Table of Contents 8 2.2.4. Special interest policy disaggregation into policy instruments 49 2.2.5. Policy outputs and outcomes 50 2.3. How interest groups impact policies 51 2.3.1. Policies create winners and losers – two assumptions 52 2.3.2. Influencing policymakers under perfect and imperfect information 53 2.3.3. Information improving mechanisms: interest group coordination and competition 57 2.3.4. Empirical implications 60 2.3.4.1. Comparative implications: Four empirical states of the world 60 2.3.4.2. Empirical implications for a competitive interest group system 63 2.3.4.3. Empirical implications for a coordinated interest group system 65 2.3.5. Observable special interest policies- always the product of lobbying? 67 2.3.6. Special interest policies and structural business power 68 2.3.7. Access points, niches and salience 69 2.4. Summary and theoretical expectations 71 3. Research Design- the layout of the analysis 73 3.1. The universe of cases 73 3.1.1. The cases for the analysis of iron and steel policies 73 3.1.2. The subset of cases for the extension of the analysis 76 3.2. Period of observation - the price boom and beyond 77 3.3. Testing the empirical implications – the empirical strategy 80 3.4. FsQCA, case studies and panel regression 81 3.5. Summary 84 4. Comparing interest group systems across countries 85 4.1. Translating the argument and theoretical expectations into „fsQCA" 85 4.2. Method, period of observation and calibration of conditions 87 4.2.1. Method and period of observation 87 4.2.2. Calibration of the conditions 89 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26935 Table of Contents 9 4.2.3. The outcome set: special interest steel policies 91 4.2.4. Interest group systems 93 4.2.4.1. Interest group coordination 94 4.2.4.2. Interest group competition 96 4.2.5. Competitiveness of the country 98 4.2.6. Specialization on the iron and steel industries 100 4.3. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis – method and data 103 4.4. Conditions for special interest steel policies 104 4.4.1. Necessary conditions for (no) special interest steel policies 105 4.4.2. Sufficient conditions for the outcome „Special interest steel policies” 105 4.4.3. Sufficient conditions for the outcome „No special interest steel policy” 109 4.4.4. Discussion 110 5. Case studies: Comparing Belgium and Germany 115 5.1. Characteristics of a coordinated interest group system 115 5.2. Case selection of coordinated interest group systems 118 5.2.1. Puzzling cases and comparisons 119 5.2.2. Case selection 121 5.2.2.1. The most deviant case- Germany 122 5.2.2.2. The most similar case to Germany- Belgium 124 5.2.3. Data collection for the cases 127 5.2.4. Interviews and data collection process 128 5.3. Analyzing the confirming case – Belgium 130 5.3.1. Classifying Belgian iron and steel policies 131 5.3.2. Policies in Belgium – including regional policies 134 5.3.2.1. Policies concerning resource efficiency 136 5.3.2.2. Policies for securing supply 138 5.3.3. Interest group systems on the federal and regional level 139 5.3.4. The Belgian case – how did the truthfulness mechanism work 144 5.3.4.1. Step 1: Policy demands and encompassingness of the umbrella organizations 145 5.3.4.2. Step 2: Truthfulness 147 5.3.4.3. Step 3: Policy Choice 149 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26935 Table of Contents 10 5.3.5. Resource supply – not an issue for the Belgian policymakers? 150 5.3.6. Alternative explanations for the absence of a special iron and steel policy 152 5.3.7. Discussion 154 5.4. Germany- an example of skewed coordination 156 5.4.1. The German Raw Materials Strategy as a special interest steel policy 157 5.4.2. Summing up the policy goals 161 5.4.3. The German system of interest group coordination 163 5.4.4. Interest groups at work- a timeline for the German Raw Materials Strategy 164 5.4.5. The German case- how the truthfulness mechanism did not work 167 5.4.5.1. Step 1: Encompassingness of the umbrella organization 168 5.4.5.2. Step 2: Truthfulness: Analyzing the content of the Raw Materials Strategy 173 5.4.5.3. Step 2: Truthfulness: Alternative policy preferences and relation to other interest groups 178 5.4.5.4. Step 3: Policy Choices – institutional entrenchment and pull factors from policymakers 182 5.4.6. Alternative explanations for the German Raw Material Strategy 184 5.4.7. Discussion 185 5.5. Comparing Belgium and Germany 187 6. A broader analysis - state aid in the European Union 193 6.1. The variety of state aid in the European Union 194 6.2. Interest group systems and state aid - the argument applied 196 6.3. Operationalization and method 198 6.3.1. Operationalization 199 6.3.1.1. Data on state aid 199 6.3.1.2. Data on interest groups 200 6.3.1.3. Control variables 204 6.3.2. Method 206 6.4. The impact of interest group systems on state aid 210 6.5. Discussion 216 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26935 Table of Contents 11 7. Conclusion 219 7.1. The argument 219 7.2. Research strategy and findings 221 7.3. Implications for political science research 226 7.4. Policy implications 227 7.5. If you are not at the table you are on the menu 229 8. References 231