1. Theory and concepts -- 2. Policy and applications.

Volume IPART ONE: CLASSICS1. R.H. Coase (1972), `Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research.'2. Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), `Organization and Information.'3. Herbert A. Simon (1962), `The Architecture of Complexity.'PART II: RUDIMENTS4. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), `Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.'5. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), `Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.'6. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), `Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.'7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), `Comparative Economic Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives.'8. David J. Teece (1982), `Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm.'PART III: PRIVATE ORDERING AND CREDIBILITY9. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), `The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.'10. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), `Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.'11. Avner Greif (1993), `Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition.'12. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), `Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.'PART IV: CONTRACTS AND ORGANIZATION13. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), `The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.'14. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), `Property Righs and the Nature of the Firm.'15. Michael H. Riordan (1990), `What is Vertical Integration.'16. Jean Tirle (1988), `The Theory of the Firm.'PART V: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION17. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), `The Limits of the Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features.'18. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1990), `Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity.'19. David M. Kreps (1990), `Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.'20. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), `Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.'21. Masahiko Aoki (1990), `Toward an Economi Model of the Japanese Firm.'PART VI: PROSPECTS AND RETROSPECTIVE22. Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1991), `The New Institutional Economics: An Assessment.'23. Ronald H. Coase (1991), `The Institutional Structure of Production.'24. Richard A. Posner (1993), `The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics.'25. Ronald H. Coase (1993), `Coase on Posner on Coase.'26. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics.'.

Volume IIPART I: VERTICAL INTEGRATION1. Benjamin Klein (1988), `Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership.'2. Paul L. Joskow (1985), `Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants.'3. Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece (1982), `Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry.'4. Scott E. Masten (1984), `The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry.'5. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), `Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination.'6. George John and Barton A. Weitz (1988), `Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analysis.'7. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan Jr. and Edward A. Synder (1991), `The Costs of Organization.'PART II: CONTRACTING8. Thomas M. Palay (1984), `Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting.'9. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), `Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke.'10. Paul L. Joskow (1987), `Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets.'11. J. Harold Mulherin (1986), `Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions.'12. Scott. E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), `Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas.'13. Keith B. Leffler and Randal R. Rucker (1991), `Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts.'14. Keith J. Crocker and Scott E. Masten (1991), `Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts.'PART III: REGULATION AND POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY15. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), `Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Respect to CATV.'16. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), `Regulation and Administered Contracts.'17. George L. Priest (1993), `The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate.`18. Brian Levy and PabloT. Spiller (1994), `The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation.'19. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), `The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.'20. Rafael Gely and Pable T. Spiller (1990), `A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases.'PART IV: ANTITRUST21. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), `Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach.'22. Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein (1983), `The Economics of Block Booking.'23. Scott E. Masten and Edward A. Snyder (1993), `United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: