PART I: AntecedentsR. Coase (1937), `The Nature of the Firm'A. Alchian (1950), `Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory'L. McKenzie (1951), `Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms'F. Modigliani (1958), `New Developments on the Oligopoly Front'G. Stigler (1964), `A Theory of Oligopoly'K. Arrow (1963), `Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care'H. Simon (1962), `The Architecture of Complexity'PART II: The New Economics of OrganizationM. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz (1976), `Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information'B. Holmstrom (1982), `Moral Hazard in Teams'J. Tirole (1986), `Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations'G. Akerlof (1983), `Loyalty Filters'O. Williamson (1979), `Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations'S. Grossman and O. Hart (1986), `The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and lateral Integration'P. Joskow (1985), `Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants'B. Klein and K. Leffler (1981), `The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractural Performance'PART III: Strategic Behaviour and CompetitionH. Demsetz (1974), `Two Systems if Belief about Monopoly'A. Dixit (1980), `The Role of Investment in Entry-deterrence'P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1987), `Contracts as a Barrier to Entry'P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1980), `Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis'D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982), `Reputation and Imperfect Information'D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole (1984), `The Fat-Cat Effect, The Puppy-Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look'W. Baumol, J. Panzar and R. Willig (1986), `On the Theory of Perfectly-contestable Markets'S. Salop (1979), `Monoplistic Competition with Outside Goods'.