Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. The Nature of the Firm -- 2. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations -- 3. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization -- 4. Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research -- 5. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process -- 6. Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives -- 7. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange -- 8. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration -- 9. The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features -- 10. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design -- 11. Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination -- 12. The Costs of Organization -- 13. Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets -- 14. Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory -- 15. Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke -- 16. Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas -- 17. The Economics of Block Booking -- 18. Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV -- 19. Regulation and Administered Contracts -- 20. The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation -- 21. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets -- Name Index.