I. Static games of complete information -- 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information -- 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information -- 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- 9. Reputation effects -- 10. Sequential bargaining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics -- 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance -- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- 14. Common knowledge and games -- Index.