Başlık:
Imperial overstretch : Germany in Soviet policy from Stalin to Gorbachev : an analysis based on new archival evidence, memoirs, and interviews
Yazar:
Adomeit, Hannes
ISBN:
9783848724529
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Basım Bilgisi:
1. Aufl
Yayım Bilgisi:
Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
609 pages. ; 23 cm.
Seri:
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit ; Bd. 48
Seri Başlığı:
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit ; Bd. 48
İçerik:
PREFACE 11 Persisting Myths 11 ‘Imperial Overstretch’ under Putin 12 ‘Eastern Europe’ 13 Personal Background and Thanks 14 Transliteration of Russian Terms 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Sources of Evidence 28 PART ONE: THE SOVIET EMPIRE 31 Chapter 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations 33 1. Conceptual Approaches 33 2. Metrocentric Approaches 38 3. Pericentric Approaches 41 4. International Systemic and Structural Approaches 46 5. Transnational Approaches 55 6. An Integrative Approach 60 PART TWO: EXPANSION 65 Chapter 2: The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm 67 1. Parameters of the Paradigm 67 2. The Division of Germany: Design or Default? 75 The Paradigm Applied: East Germany and Eastern Europe 3. 91 The Impact of the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War 4. 102 5 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26045 Stalin’s 1952 ‘Peace Note’: Lost Opportunity or Political Manoeuvre? 5. 110 6. Imperial Dilemmas: Beria and the Crisis in the GDR 116 7. Imperial Dilemmas: The Berlin Wall 125 Consolidation of the Soviet Empire and the ‘Correlation of Forces’ 8. 137 9. Soviet Responses to West Germany’s Ostpolitik 142 10.Soviet Responses to East Germany’s Assertiveness 150 Chapter 3: The Comprehensive Crisis of Empire 163 1. The Crisis of Ideology 163 2. Military Power and Declining Political Influence 167 Declining Economic Performance and the "Costs of Empire" 3. 174 4. The Domestic Political Crisis 183 The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-East German Relations 5. 191 The Impact of the Crisis on Soviet-West German Relations 6. 199 7. Debts, Dependency, and Intra-German Relations 203 8. Pravda Articles of Faith 209 The Chernenko-Honecker Emergency Meeting in Moscow 9. 212 Summary 228 PART FOUR: COLLAPSE 231 Chapter 4: Gorbachev’s Old and New Thinking 233 1. The Paradigm of New Thinking 233 2. Gorbachev: A Political Profile 239 3. Gorbachev’s Perceptions of the German Problem 259 East Germany: Strategic Ally but Waning Economic Asset 4. 266 West Germany: Troublesome Tenant in Gorbachev’s ‘Common House of Europe’ 5. 291 6. Priority for the Relations with the United States 305 Table of Contents 6 http://www.nomos-shop.de/26045 7. German Unification in a ‘Hundred Years’ 313 Gorbachev and Eastern Europe: Decline of the Will to Empire 8. 328 Summary 357 Chapter 5: Domestic Implications of Gorbachev’s German Policy 361 1. The Institutional Setting 361 The Academy of Sciences: International Relations Institutes and Specialists 2. 365 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 379 The CPSU: Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee Departments 4. 393 5. The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces 416 6. The KGB 438 Chapter 6: The Last Crisis 463 1. The Transformed Internal and International Setting 463 2. The Demise of the Honecker Regime 488 3. Gorbachev and Krenz 508 4. The Collapse of the Berlin Wall 525 5. German Unification on the International Agenda 536 6. Gorbachev's Acceptance of German Unification 563 Gorbachev's Consent to United Germany's Membership in NATO 7. 597 8. The ‘Price Tag’ of the Consent 659 CONCLUSIONS 683 The Gorbachev Era 687 Collapse of the Soviet Empire: The Utility of Theories of Imperialism 695 Lessons Unlearned: Putin in Brezhnev’s Footsteps 702
Özet:
This book focuses on the dynamics which led to the division of Germany - a process that occurred by default rather than design; the role played in that process by the Soviet Union under Stalin; the reasons why his successors, from Khrushchev to the Communist Party general secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, stubbornly clung to the division of Germany for almost half a century; their increasing realisation of the 'costs of an empire'; the failure of their attempts to stop East Germany's increasing dependence on West Germany; and, finally, the reasons why Gorbachev accepted the dissolution of the Soviet empire, abandoned his 'strategic ally' and consented to the unified Germany's membership of NATO. The Soviet Union, the book concludes, had overextended itself in its attempt to maintain imperial control by the constant application of 'hard power'. The lesson for today is obvious, but Putin appears set to repeat the fateful course pursued by his Soviet predecessors.
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Library | Materyal Türü | Demirbaş | Yer Numarası | Durumu / Lokasyon / İade Tarihi |
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Arıyor... | Kitap | EKOBKN0009834 | 303.48243047 ADO 2017 | Arıyor... |