Volume 1. General -- Volume 2. Trade -- Volume 3. Finance -- Volume 4. Environment.

Volume I 1. Rationale 1. R. O. Keohane (1982), 'The Demand for International Regimes', International Organization, 36, 2, 325-55. 2. M. Fratianni and J. Pattison (1982), 'The Economics of International Organization', Kyklos, 35, 244-66. 3. A. A. Stein (1982), 'Coordination and Collaboration, Regimes in an Anarchic World', International Organization, 36, 2, 299-324. 4. J. Tinbergen (1977), Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome (New York: New American Library), 11-24. 5. H. G. Grubel (1977), 'The Case Against the New International Economic Order', Weltwitschaftliches Archiv, 2, 284-307. 2. Principles 6. C. F. Amrasinghe (1996), Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1-23. 3. Organizations and Structures 7. B. S. Frey (1984), 'How Do International Organisations Function?', International Political Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 143-64. 8. N. Woods and A. Narlikar (2001), 'Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank', International Social Science Journal, 53, 170, 569-83. 9. R. Vaubel (2006), 'Principal Agent Problems in International Organizations', Review of International Organizations, 1, 125-38. 10. A. M. Slaughter (2000), 'Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks', in M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ, Press), 177-205. 4. Compliance 11. K. Raustiala (2000), 'Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation. Part 2: Compliance, Implementation and Effectiveness', Case Western Journal of International Law, 32, 387-98. 12. B. Simmons (1998), 'Compliance with International Agreements', Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 75-93. 13. K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal (2001), 'International Standards and International Governance', Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 3, 345-70. 14. J. Merills (2003), 'The Means of Dispute Settlement', in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press), pp. 529-57. 15. R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, and A. M. Slaughter (2000), 'Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational', International Organization, 54, 3, 457-88. 5. Results 16. W. Molle (2003), 'Evaluation and Outlook', Global Economic Institutions (London: Routledge), 261-83. Volume II: Trade 6. Rationale (Problems, Solutions) 17. W. Molle (2003), 'From Protection to Free Trade in Goods and Services', Global Economic Institutions (London: Routledge), 135-43. 18. R. Prebisch et al. (1950), The Economic Development of Latin America, and its Principal Problems (New York: UN, ECLA), 1-18. 19. J. Frankel and D. Romer (1999), 'Does Trade Cause Growth?', American Economic Review, 89, 3, 379-99. 20. H. Yanikkaya (2003), 'Trade Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Investigation', Journal of Development Economics, 72, 57-89. 7. Principles 21. S. H. Bailey (1932), 'The Political Aspect of Discrimination in International Economic Relations', Economica, 35, 89-115. 22. H. Horn and P. Mavroidis (2001), 'Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most Favored Nation Clause', European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 233-79. 23. P. McCalman (2002), 'Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause', Journal of International Economics, 57, 151-76. 24. B. Hindley (1987), 'Different and More Favourable Treatment-and Graduation', in J. M. Finger and A. Olechowski (eds.), The Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Washington DC: The World Bank), 67-74. 25. K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger (2001), 'Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System', European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 281-325. 8. Organization, Operations, Structure 26. A. Dixit, A. (1998), 'Transaction Cost Politics and Economic Policy: A Framework and a Case Study', in M. Baldassarri, L. Paganetto, and E. S. Phelps (eds.), Institutions and Economic Organizations in Advanced Economies: The Governance Perspective (Basingstoke, Macmillan), 139-75. 27. J. M. Finger (1991), 'The GATT as an International Discipline Over Trade Restrictions: A Public Choice Approach', in R. Vaubel and T. D. Willett (eds.), The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press), 125-41. 28. G. Orcalli (2003), 'A Constitutional Interpretation of the GATT/WTO', Constitutional Political Economy, 14, 141-54. 29. J. McMillan (1989), 'A Game Theoretic View of International Trade Negotiations: Implications for Developing Countries', in J. Whalley (ed.), Developing Countries and the Global Trading System, Vol. 1 (Basingstoke: Macmillan), 26-44. 9. Compliance 30. J. N. Bhagwati (1976), 'Market Disruption, Export Market Disruption, Compensation and GATT Reform', World Development, 4, 12, 989-1020. 31. M. L. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2000), 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlements in GATT/WTO Disputes', Fordham International Law Journal, 24, 158-72. 32. M. Buetler and H. Hauser (2000), 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16, 2, 503-33. 33. S. Picciotto (2005), 'The WTO Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance', Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18, 3, 477-503. 10. Results 34. A. K. Rose (2004), 'Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?', American Economic Review, 94, 1, 98-114. Volume III: Finance 11. Rationale, Problems, Solutions 35. Ch. Wyplosz (1999), 'International Financial Instability', in I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods (Geneva: UNDP), 152-89. 36. K. Rogoff (1999), 'International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 4, 21-42. 37. M. Aglietta (1995), 'The International Monetary System', in R. Boyer and Y. Saillard (eds.), Regulation Theory: The State of the Art (London: Routledge), 64-71. 38. D. Vines and C. L. Gilbert (2004), 'The IMF and International Financial Architecture: Solvency and Liquidity', in D. Vines and C. L. Gilbert (eds.), The IMF and its Critics: Reform of the Global Financial Architecture (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 8-35. 12. Principles 39. P. Mosley (1992), 'A Theory of Conditionality', in idem (ed.), Development Finance and Policy Reform (London: St Martins Press), pp. 129-53. 40. P. Collier et al. (1997), 'Redesigning Conditionality', World Development, 25, 9, 1399-407. 41. A. Dreher (2004), 'A Public Choice Perspective on IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality', Public Choice, 119, 445-64. 13. Organizations; Operations; Structure 42. S. C. Thacker (1999), 'The High Politics of IMF Lending', World Politics, 52, 1, 38-75. 43. R. Vaubel (1991), 'The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund: A Public Choice Analysis', in R. Vaubel and T. Willett (eds.), The Political Economy of International Organisations: A Public Choice Approach (Boulder: Westview Press), 204-44. 44. J. E. Stiglitz (2003), 'Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank: Governance and Accountability', Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 16, 1, 111-39. 14. Compliance 45. B. A. Simmons (2000), 'International Law and State Behaviour: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs', American Political Science Review, 94, 4, 819-35. 46. J. R. Vreeland (2006), 'IMF Program Compliance: Aggregate Index Versus Policy Specific Strategies', Review of International Organisations, 1, 359-78. 47. D. E. Ho (2002), 'Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?', Journal of International Economic Law, 5, 647-88. 15. Results 48. G. Bird (1996), 'The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Review